Religion, Schools, and Judicial Decision Making:
An Empirical Perspective
Michael Heiset & Gregory C. Sisktt

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of modern religious-liberty jurisprudence,
the most difficult and penetrating questions about the proper
relationship between church and state have arisen with special
frequency, controversy, and fervor in the often-charged atmosphere
of education. As Professor Joseph Viteritti notes, "As far back as can
be remembered, religion has been at the center of American
education, as a source of both inspiration and agitation."' Likewise,
Professor Thomas Berg observes that "religion and education are
perennially mixing."2 When reviewing the battles about when the
state must accommodate the religious demands of individual citizens
and how the government should balance recognition of religious
traditions in American history against the prohibition on
government endorsement of religion, we find that school boards,
school administrators, teachers, students, and their parents have

often occupied the front lines.'
Schools and the religion clauses collide persistently,

and

litigation frames many of these collisions. Current collisions rest on a
deep legal history and approaches to resolving them continue to

evolve over time. Indeed, the Supreme Court's first encounters with

f Professor, Cornell Law School.
tt Laghi Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
We thank Dawn M. Chutkow as well as participants in the Understanding Education in the
United States Symposium at the University of Chicago Law School for comments on an earlier
draft. Professor Sisk offers thanks to his assistant, Bethany Fletcher, for recording data coding
and to law students Eric Beecher and Alicia Long for assistance with opinion coding. A
spreadsheet containing our data set, regression run results, coding of each decision, coding of
each judge, and code books may be found at http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk
/religion.study.data/cover.html.
I
Joseph P. Viteritti, The Last Freedom: Religion from the Public School to the Public
Square 74 (Princeton 2007).
2
Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School PrayerDecisions: Civil Religion under Assault,
in Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, eds, First Amendment Stories 193, 194 (West
2011).
3
See Viteritti, The Last Freedom at 204-05 (cited in note 1).

The University of Chicago Law Review

both of the religion clauses of the
era were in the education context.
recognized as the first application
Clause of the First Amendment

[79:185

First Amendment in the modern
In 1925, in what later came to be
of the Free Exercise of Religion
against the states, the Supreme

Court held in Pierce v Society of Sisters' that Oregon could not
mandate that all children attend public schools and override a
religiously motivated parental preference to send their children to
religious schools.! Many decades later, in Employment Division v

Smith,' the Court described Pierce as an example of the "Free
Exercise Clause [working] in conjunction with other constitutional
protections," specifically, "the right of parents ...to direct the
education of their children."' In 1947, in Everson v Board of

Education, the Supreme Court first applied the Establishment
Clause against the states, turning away a challenge to the use of

public funds to reimburse parochial school students for bus
transportation.' And, in a landmark decision that continues to invite
contest a half century later, the Supreme Court's Engel v Vitale"
decision in 1962 ended officially sponsored prayer in public schools."
Educational policy makers' interest in nonpublic schools,
including religious schools, is long standing and flows from at least

two prominent sources. One source involves private schools' record
of addressing their students' educational needs. The modern
scholarly effort to assess the educational efficacy of public and
private schools was launched largely by the groundbreaking research
of Professor James Coleman and various colleagues at the University
of Chicago and focused on studies of Catholic schools.'2 A second,
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more recent, and newly emerging source involves nonpublic schools'
ability to generate important positive externalities for the
communities surrounding these schools."
As various school reform initiatives increasingly seek to
leverage private and religious schools in the service of improving
education, the number and magnitude of legal collisions involving
the religion clauses increase." Publicly funded voucher programs, for
example, are among the most visible (and recent) of such educationreform initiatives. Inevitably, such school reform initiatives triggered
litigation. While the Supreme Court resolved a critical Establishment
Clause question arising from the public funding of a voucher
program that included substantial religious school participation in
6
2002 in Zelman v Simmons-Harris,"derivative litigation persists."
Indeed, last term the Supreme Court once again waded into
turbulent religion clauses waters when it deflected challenges to an
Arizona statewide scholarship-tax-credit program in Arizona
Christian School Tuition Organization v Winn.'7 Under the Arizona
program, citizens who donate to qualifying nonprofit organizations
are entitled to take a dollar-for-dollar tax credit against their state
taxes-up to $500 per taxpayer. " Recipient nonprofit organizations
include religious elementary and secondary schools. The Court's 5-4
decision, reversing the Ninth Circuit, concluded that Arizona
taxpayers lack standing to challenge the provision of tax credits for
contributions to organizations that subsidize tuition at private
religious schools." Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the
majority, argued that the taxpayers could not avail themselves of the
narrow exception to the general rule against taxpayer standing
created by Flast v Cohen.' Echoing a theme from Zelman, the
Court's decision in Winn emphasizes that any funding to religious
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schools was a function of private taxpayer action rather than state
activity."
While voucher programs certainly garner substantial public
attention, such programs do not fully describe the breadth of the
intersections among public schools, religion, education reform, and
religious schools. For example, many public school districts have
recently become far more amenable to introducing religious subjects
into the formal school curriculum.2 Additionally, one aspect of the
No Child Left Behind Act,' easily the federal government's most
significant foray into the nation's elementary and secondary schools,"
that has generated relatively little public discussion is how the law
facilitates public financial support for religious faith-based groups
that provide tutoring services to students who qualify for such
supplemental services, so long as the services provided are secular. 5
That various education-reform initiatives continue to implicate
religious schools, the Court's evolving religion clause jurisprudence,
and the particular application of the religion clauses in the education
setting underscore the need to gain a clearer understanding of how
federal courts resolve such claims. While scholars approach such
questions from an array of perspectives, ours is empirical and focuses
on various background factors that are thought to inform religionclauses-litigation outcomes that involve elementary and secondary
schools. Although different models seek to structure the relation
between schools and the First Amendment in different ways, in this
Article we dwell on one such model that we have considered
previously, the "proreligion" model. 6
Partly owing to the Supreme Court's use of malleable balancing
tests and open-ended exceptions, the religion clauses doctrine is
noted for instability and uncertainty. Doctrinal instability and
uncertainty affords lower federal court judges ample space to
exercise their judgment and discretion in resolving religious cases.
See Winn, 131 S Ct at 1447.
See Viteritti, The Last Freedom at 228 (cited in note 1).
23
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24
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Insofar as our school cases overlay a frequently highly charged
political context-elementary and secondary education-on to
religious issues, the prospect for extrajudicial factors to influence
judicial outcomes increases.' One benefit for empiricists, then, is that
precisely because lower federal court judges are not typically bound
by determinate high-court precedent, a study, such as ours, of factors
that influence judicial decisions in this area is likely to bear fruit.29
Incident to our larger, ongoing empirical examination of
religious-liberty decisions in the lower federal courts,' this Article
examines the efficacy of the proreligion model in the education
setting. To do so, we studied all digested Establishment and Free
Exercise Clause decisions by federal court of appeals and district
court judges from 1996 through 2005 that involved elementary and
secondary schools. As it relates to differences between school and
other (or nonschool) cases, what we find, in brief, is that our
alternative ideology variables of party of appointing President and
common space scores achieve significance.' That is, while
Republican-appointed judges were more likely than their
Democratic-appointed counterparts to reach a proreligion decision
in school cases, ideology did not correlate with a proreligion
outcome in nonschool cases. Results using common space scores as a
proxy for ideology were similar. Two other sets of results also
warrant note. First, judges with prior judicial experience as well as
the more senior federal judges were less likely to reach proreligion
decisions in school cases but not in nonschool cases. Second, we
note that for school cases an increase in the percentage of the
population that is Jewish in a jurisdiction increased the likelihood of
a proreligion decision. In contrast, for nonschool cases an increase in

See Diane Ravitch, The Troubled Crusade: American Education, 1945-1980 29-32
28
(Basic Books 1983); Diane Ravitch, The Great School Wars: A History of the New York City
PublicSchools 168, 257, 362 (Johns Hopkins 2000).
See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 Ariz L Rev 9, 46 (2001) ("Where law and
29
precedent provide weak guidelines rather than mandates, the judge's decision is more likely to
be the product of attitudes and environment.").
30 See Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Ideology "All The Way Down"? An Empirical
Study of Establishment Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 Mich L Rev *3, 6-30
(forthcoming 2012), online at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1791214
(visited Oct 27, 2011); Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and
Academic Debates about Statistical Measures, 99 Nw U L Rev 743, 764-69 (2005); Gregory C.
Sisk, How Traditional and Minority Religions Fare in the Courts: Empirical Evidence from
Religious Liberty Cases, 76 U Colo L Rev 1021, 1036-37 (2005); Sisk, Heise, and Morriss,
65 Ohio St L J at 555-57, 571-73 (cited in note 26).
31
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the percentage of Catholics decreased the likelihood of a proreligion
outcome.32
This Article proceeds in two parts. Part I describes our data and
research methods. Our principal results are discussed in Part II. In
our Conclusion, we emphasize the limitations of our results and
consider ways in which this line of research might be fruitfully
expanded and developed in the future.
I. DATA AND METHODOLOGY

A.

Data

Consistent with our prior empirical work on the federal courts,
we focus on lower federal court judges and their decisions in cases
raising constitutional religious freedom issues.3 Specifically, we
created a database of the universe of digested decisions by the
federal district courts and courts of appeals resolving challenges to
the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses from 1996 to 2005.' As
the decisions were collected, the direction of each judge's ruling, the
general factual category of the case, the religious affiliation of the
judge, the religious demographics of the judge's community, the
judge's ideology, the judge's race and gender, and various
background and employment variables for the judge were coded.
We treated each individual judge's ruling in an individual case as
a "judicial participation," which served as our unit of analysis." Each
district judge's ruling was coded separately, as was each individual
vote by the multiple judges participating on an appellate panel.
Accordingly, the primary focus of our study was the judge rather
than the court as an institution or a collective appellate panel. That
is, we measured the individual response of each judge to each
religion clauses claim.
See Part II.B.
See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise, and Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences
on the Judicial Mind: An EmpiricalStudy of JudicialReasoning, 73 NYU L Rev 1377, 1415-16
(1998); Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise, and Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in
Federal DistrictCourt Opinions, 13 S Ct Econ Rev 63, 67-72 (2005); Sisk and Heise, 99 Nw U L
Rev at 761-62 (cited in note 30). For a discussion of why we feel a study of lower federal court
opinions is especially apt in this context, see Sisk and Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *7-9 (cited in
note 30) (describing the rationale behind collecting data on federal circuit and district court
opinions when evaluating the effects of judicial ideology on outcomes in religious freedom
cases).
34 See note 46 and accompanying text.
35 For more detailed information about our study, data collection, and coding, see Sisk,
Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 529-53 (cited in note 26).
36
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A few research design points deserve attention. As our study
endeavors to assess judicial decision making, we excluded decisions
by Supreme Court justices from our data set. Although the Supreme
Court has the final word in constitutional decisions, the lion's share
of federal constitutional cases are resolved by lower federal courts.37
Also, owing to the small and stable number of justices serving on the
Court, we find that empirical studies of the members of that unique
institution sometimes migrate from social science to biography.
Moreover, as discussed above, because the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence regarding both the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses has been unstable over time and uncertain in application, the
district and appellate court judges have retained important
decisional latitude in this area. While Supreme Court precedent
certainly plays a key role in federal litigation in the lower courts,
there remains substantial play in the doctrine as applied to an
individual case and set of facts. For this reason, the body of litigation
in the federal district courts and courts of appeals is particularly
amenable to a meaningful empirical analysis of influences upon
judicial decision making. Finally, we believe that for decades social
scientists' and legal academics' focus on the Supreme Court may
have come at the expense of scholarly attention to the lower federal
courts.'
Given our decision to focus on lower federal courts, however, our
inclusion of district judges along with courts of appeals judges in this
study and our coding both types of judges in the same way on merits
decisions warrant discussion. Our effort to expand empirical study
beyond circuit judges and evaluate the larger pool of lower federal
judges has merit, particularly in the constitutional rulings context. To
be sure, many scholars are conducting important research on district
court judges through quantitative study of dockets and developments
and rulings at the multiple stages of the civil litigation process."
Recognizing that "the nature of district court judges' work is
37 See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion,82 NYU L Rev 383, 391 (2007).
38

Encouragingly, the traditional focus on the Supreme Court has been broadened in the

last decade, with the federal courts of appeals and district courts becoming the subject of
increasing attention among political scientists and legal academics doing empirical work. For a
brief summary, see Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 529 n 156 (cited in note 26).
39 See, for example, Christina L. Boyd and David A. Hoffman, Disputing Limited
Liability, 104 Nw U L Rev 853, 877-78 (2010); Pauline T. Kim, et al, How Should We Study
DistrictJudge Decision-Making?, 29 Wash U J L & Pol 83, 101 (2009); James D. Cox, Randall
S. Thomas, and Lynn Bai, There Are Plaintiffs and ...There Are Plaintiffs: An Empirical
Analysis of Securities Class Action Settlements, 61 Vand L Rev 355, 367 (2008); David L.
Schwartz, PracticeMakes Perfect? An EmpiricalStudy of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 Mich L Rev 223,237 (2008).
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substantially different from that of appellate judges," many of these
scholars tailor their empirical research to the distinct institutional
setting of the district court. ' While we feel such work is important, we
nonetheless concluded that a docket-oriented approach was neither
possible nor particularly well-suited for our study of outcomes in
religious cases. In the particular context of constitutional rulings, the
appellate court's typical deferential posture regarding trial court
factual determinations gives way to the "constitutional fact" exception
for "factual" disputes that frequently reside at the heart of a
constitutional question." Moreover, trial and appellate judges share
parallel responsibilities for resolving contested constitutional
questions, including the central constitutional significance of factual
assertions, precisely "to prevent the idiosyncrasies
of a single judge or
4' 2
jury from having far-reaching legal effects."
As such, we first needed to place trial court rulings in the same
decisional space as appellate court rulings, thus requiring us to focus

on merits rulings and not preliminary nonmerits rulings. Second, we
examined decisions from 1996 to 2005, but the various federal docket
and pleading databases are generally reliable only from 2000."3 In

particular, the restricted search options and limited nature of case
coding of federal court dockets databases, especially when searching
for cases raising religious-liberty issues, functionally precluded

effective use of these sources for the time period of our study."
A further complicating wrinkle flows from the small percentage
of district court dispositions that generate a written opinion,4" which is
See Kim, et al, 29 Wash U J L & Pol at 85, 101-06 (cited in note 39).
See Rankin v McPherson, 483 US 378, 385 n 8 (1987) (noting that trial court fact
findings are subject to "constitutional fact review" by the appellate court). See also Henry P.
Monaghan, ConstitutionalFact Review, 85 Colum L Rev 229, 229-32 (1985).
42
See A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v Newman, 305 F3d 684, 689 (7th
Cir 2002) ("That admixture of fact and law, sometimes called an issue of 'constitutional fact,' is
reviewed without deference in order to prevent the idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from
having far-reaching legal effects.").
43
See Boyd and Hoffman, 104 Nw U L Rev at 877 n 119, 880 (cited in note 39).
44 See Mary Whisner, Unanswerable Questions, 100 L Library J 581, 583 (2008) (noting
that the "Nature of Suit" coding in the federal docket PACER system lacks the detail needed
for finding many types of cases); Gillian K. Hadfield, Judging Science: An Essay on the
Unscientific Basis of Beliefs about the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better
Data about Law, 14 J L & Pol 137, 144-45 (2006) (observing that cases are coded in the
PACER docket for a single type, even if the cases involve multiple causes of action).
45 See David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman, and Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology,
District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 Wash U L Rev 681, 710 & n 139 (2007) (finding that only
18 percent of district court cases produced written decisions); Margo Schlanger and Denise
Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and Policymaking: The Civil Rights
Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L Rev 155, 165 (2006) (finding that 8.7 percent of
terminated cases in federal district court left written decisions and 2.3 percent resulted in
40

41
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the data point for our study. For the high-visibility area of religion
clauses challenges, however, we believe that the rate of district court
dispositions through written, even published, decisions is much higher
than the base rate. To test our belief, a spot check of a hundred
Establishment Clause complaints produced in a search of the Westlaw
pleadings database revealed that nearly three-quarters lead to written
decisions, most of which were also published. To be sure, our search
process undoubtedly captured a larger share of appellate rather than
district court activity. In our school case subset we find 78 district
court judicial participations (24.1 percent) and 246 appellate court
judicial participations (75.9 percent). Accordingly, readers fairly might
place greater weight on our findings with respect to court of appeals
judges than to district court judges.
In our prior study of 1986-1995 religious-liberty decisions, for
substantive and practical reasons, we included only published
*decisions in our database. In so doing, we knowingly "biased our
database in favor of decisions that raise highly visible, controversial,
landmark, or difficult questions of religious freedom, or at least issues of
religious freedom that a judicial actor found particularly interesting and
thus worthy of publication."' For this 1996-2005 study, we have
expanded the database to include the set of unpublished but digested
opinions available on Westlaw. In addition to 1,921 judicial
participations from published decisions, our data set includes 401 judge
votes from decisions that were digested by Westlaw but not published in
the reporter system. Because not all decisions, even those that are
written, are digested, the data set still is likely to be skewed to the more
significant decisions. Thus, our data set may be biased toward decisions
that raise highly visible, controversial, landmark, or difficult
questions of religious freedom, or at least issues of religious liberty
that a judicial actor found particularly interesting. Fortunately, those
are precisely the types of decisions that we would wish to analyze for
evidence of variation among judges in their response to significant
constitutional problems upon which reasonable people could
disagree.

reported decisions); Susan M. Olson, Studying FederalDistrict Courts through PublishedCases:
A Research Note, 15 Just Sys J 782, 789-90 (1992) (finding that 5.3 percent of the district court
cases in the study resulted in published decisions, with significant variation in the publication
rate among different types of cases).
46 Sisk, 76 U Colo L Rev at 1049 (cited in note 30).
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Having decided to focus on published and digested decisions, we
conducted a search on Westlaw for all decisions 7 in which the digests
of the opinions prepared by West include the terms "free exercise,"
"establishment clause," "establishment of religion," "religious
freedom restoration act," or "equal access act." In addition, we
searched for the appearance in the opinion digests of "free speech,"
"equal protection," "due process," "title vii," and "discrimination" as
connected to religious phrases. '
To be coded as a decision on the merits, a ruling by a district
judge must have accepted or rejected a particular claim in a manner
that engaged the underlying merits of the claim, even if the ruling
was not a final judgment. We excluded nonmerits justiciability
decisions and procedural rulings from our study. 9 For court of
appeals judges, a ruling was coded on the merits if it affirmed or
reversed a final judgment by a district court on an Establishment or
Free Exercise Clause claim or remanded the case after an evaluation
of a significant element of the merits of the claim." If a three-judge
appellate panel issued a decision that later was reheard en banc (or
was the subject of a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc),
each judge was recorded as having cast only one judicial vote, even if
the judge participated on both the three-judge panel and the en banc
panel (or the dissent from the denial of rehearing)."
Our dependent variable, proreligion, reflects the direction of the
individual judge's vote in each case, coded as "1" when the outcome
favored religion and as "0" when religion was disfavored. We crafted
our dependent variable by blending two distinct streams of cases.
Thus, decisions upholding free exercise or related accommodation
claims (thus affirming the vitality of the religious exercise or
expression and elevating it above nonvital governmental controls)
and decisions rejecting Establishment Clause claims (thus approving
47 By adopting the universe of decisions in the selected time period as the basis for
collecting the data, we avoid issues of sampling in this study, other than, of course, the problem
of our unavoidable omission of unpublished decisions, discussed earlier. See Part I.B.
48 As evidenced in our description of the background variables for the judges involved in
this study, the US Appeals Courts Database, for which Professor Donald R. Songer at the
University of South Carolina was the principal investigator, is an invaluable resource. See
Donald R. Songer, US Appeals Courts Database (The Judicial Research Initiative at the
University of South Carolina), online at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appct.htm (visited Oct
28, 2011). However, as will be apparent in what follows, the scope of religious-liberty decisions
that we wish to explore is more expansive than is captured in that database's coding of court of
appeals decisions in such categories as free exercise of religion and establishment of religion.
49 See Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 546 (cited in note 26).
50 See id at 547-48.
51 See id at 552-53.
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governmental acknowledgment or support, at least on a neutral
basis, for religious sentiments or institutions) were treated as
decisions favoring religion. In contrast, decisions that rejected free
exercise or related accommodation claims as well as decisions
upholding Establishment Clause claims were treated as disfavoring
religion.
Of course, by adopting a "favoring" and "disfavoring" religion
coding scheme, we in no way intend to imply that any individual
judge or scholar who resists giving preferential treatment to religious
practice under the Free Exercise Clause or who insists upon a strict
separation of church and state under the Establishment Clause is
hostile to religious faith or is in any way antireligious. Rather, we
adopt a more positive tack by suggesting that a person who takes the
position of upholding the priority of religious practice in the absence
of a compelling governmental interest and who generally approves of
the open participation of religious individuals in community affairs
and the accommodation of religious institutions with government
can be plausibly characterized as proreligion in public life.
Our final data set consists of 2,322 judicial participations, drawn
from 1,091 distinct decisions. As Table 1 illustrates, of the universe
of judicial participations, 324 involved elementary or secondary
schools (public and nonpublic). In our subset of school cases, just
under one-half (46.9 percent) were classified as proreligion
outcomes. While the overwhelming majority (81.1 percent) of other
cases (that is, cases not involving schools) dealt with Free Exercise
Clause claims, within the smaller subset of school cases, Free
Exercise claims were a slight minority (45.4 percent). In summary,
the particular subset of judicial participations of interest, school
cases, benefits from a relatively equal mix of proreligion and nonproreligion outcomes as well as Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause claims.
TABLE 1. SUMMARY OF CASE TYPES

(1996-2005)

Establishment
Clause

Free
Exercise
Clause

(N)

Proreligion
Decision

All Cases:

555

1,767

2,322

955

School Cases:

177

147

324

152
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Methodology

Our effort to model the likelihood of proreligion decisions
draws heavily on our prior work.52 Because we analyzed the
influences of an array of independent variables, multiple regression
models were adopted. As our dependent variable is dichotomous, we
estimated logistic regression models. 3 Our two primary models
(using different proxies for ideology) were nearly identical in the
percentage of the overall variation explained and were largely
parallel in statistically significant variable correlations.
Our independent variables are organized into three broad
categories: case types, judges' background and demography, and
community demography. As for case types, insofar as we are
particularly interested in the proreligion decisions in the education
context, "School Case" identifies those cases involving private or
public elementary or secondary schools. Moreover, for reasons we
describe more fully below, we felt that legal theory as well as the
practical distribution of our data support including a dummy
variable, "Establishment Clause Case," which permits us to
distinguish between the two distinct streams of decisions in our data
set (Establishment and Free Exercise Clause decisions). This
distinction is necessary as a control, as we believe that the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause cases were likely to
systematically differ in terms of their probability of generating a
proreligion outcome. Indeed, at the descriptive level, results in
Table 2 suggest as much. Of the 147 Establishment Clause cases
involving schools, 101 (or 68.7 percent) resulted in proreligion
decisions. In contrast, of the 177 free exercise cases, only 71 (or
40.1 percent) generated proreligion decisions.

52 See Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 557, 572, 614 (cited in note 26); Sisk and
Heise, 99 Nw U L Rev at 764-67 (cited in note 30); Sisk, 76 U Colo L Rev at 1036-37 (cited in
note 30) (revealing that the claimant's religion influences the likelihood that he or she will
prevail in a religious freedom case); Sisk and Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *3 (cited in note 30).
53 See Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 553-54 & n 235 (cited in note 26).

Religion, Schools, and JudicialDecision Making

20121

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF PRORELIGION DECISIONS IN SCHOOL
CASES, BY CASE TYPE

Proreligion
Case Type:
Establishment
Clause
Free Exercise
Clause

(N)

Non-proreligion

46

101

106

71

152

172

Although our interest dwells on whether judicial decisions are
proreligion, our research necessarily draws on the larger judicial
decision-making literature."
As such, a second category of
independent variables focuses on the judges-specifically, their
religion, background, gender, and ideology. For background
information on judges we drew on several sources, including
standard biographies on federal judges," online databases,
independent research into the records of Senate judicial
confirmation hearings at the National Archives, and an earlier
survey of federal judges on certain subjects where the information
was uncertain. 7
To the extent that the religious demographics of the community
in which the judge maintains chambers (the Catholic percentage in
the community, the Jewish percentage in the community, and the
total adherence rate to any religious group in a community) might
inform judicial outcomes, we include those variables. Finally, to

54 See, for example, Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U
Chi L Rev 831, 832-33 (2008).
55 See 1 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary 1-2 (Aspen 2011); 2 Almanac of the Federal
Judiciary 1-2 (Aspen 2011); Marie T. Finn, et al, eds, The American Bench: Judges of the Nation
v-vi (Forster-Long 21st ed 2011); BiographicalDirectory of the FederalJudiciary1789-2000 ix-x
(Bernan 2001); Who's Who in American Law vi (Marquis Who's Who 17th ed 2011).
56
In particular, we obtained valuable information from Gary Zuk, Deborah J. Barrow,
and Gerard S. Gryski, Multi-user Database on the Attributes of United States Appeals Court
Judges, 1801-2000 (National Archive of Criminal Justice Data 2010), online at
http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/icpsrO6796 (visited Oct 28, 2011).
57
When we conducted a survey of certain judges on whom data was uncertain about
prior employment background, we obtained an extraordinary rate of return from the federal
judges to whom the survey was sent, in excess of 90 percent. The National Archives research
on Senate judicial confirmation hearings and the survey responses from the federal judges who
were contacted are on file with the authors.
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account for any possible time trend during the ten years of data, we
also include the year of decision as a variable.
II. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We estimate a proreligion judicial outcome model for lower
federal court cases that involved elementary and secondary schools
using logistic regression. Table 3 presents our results.
TABLE 3. LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR PRORELIGION
MODEL, FEDERAL COURTS (1996-2005)

(1)

(2)

(3)

All

School
Cases

Other
Cases

Cases

(4)
All

(5)
School

(6)
Other

Cases

Cases

Cases

-0.073
(.165)

-0.079
(.165)
0.982**
(.148)

0.957**
(.321)

0.968**
(.131)

0.986**
(.147)

0.991**
(.310)

0.969**
(.130)

Catholic

-0.017
(.129)

0.130
(.417)

-0.014
(.130)

-0.022
(.130)

0.173
(.425)

-0.021
(.133)

Baptist

-0.232
(.174)

-0.118
(.789)

-0.204
(.148)

-0.231
(.170)

-0.096
(.825)

-0.200
(.142)

Other
Christian
Jewish

-0.206
(.128)

-0.309
(.565)

-0.189
(.133)

-0.215
(.124)

-0.452
(.524)

-0.193
(.132)

-0.032
(.217)

-0.657
(.492)

0.068
(.220)

-0.044
(.217)

-0.608
(.478)

Other

-0.154
(.189)

-0.605
(.853)

-0.107
(.184)

-0.168
(.199)

-0.714
(.754)

0.056
(.222)
-0.121
(.193)

None

-0.095
(.149)

-0.091
(.619)

-0.109
(.182)

-0.097
(.156)

-0.062
(.597)

-0.116
(.188)

0.133
(.099)
0.151
(.165)

0.489
(.471)

0.084
(.095)

0.140
(.104)

0.580
(.461)

0.083
(.103)

-0.370
(.467)

0.242
(.189)

-0.213
(.987)

0.533**
(.183)

-0.249
(.474)
-0.011
(.896)

0.235
(.198)

0.460*
(.216)

0.153
(.179)
0.488*
(.210)

School Case
Establishment
Clause Case
Judge Religion:

Judge Sex
and Race:
Sex (Female)
African
American
Asian/Latino

0.542**
(.182)

20121

Religion, Schools, and JudicialDecision Making

Judge Ideology
or Attitude:
Common
Space Score

(1)
All

(2)
School

Cases

Cases

0.295
(.155)

1.539**
(.423)

(3)
Other
Cases

(4)
All
Cases

(5)
School
Cases

(6)
Other
Cases

0.158
(.151)

Party of
Appointing
President

0.202
(.140)

1.189**
(.423)

0.089
(.128)

ABA
RatingAbove
Qualified

0.002
(.097)

-0.011
(.324)

-0.015 1
(.099)

0.012
(.098)

0.053
(.315)

-0.010
(.099)

ABA
RatingBelow
Qualified

0.186
(.150)

0.731
(.646)

0.104
(.142)

0.201
(.138)

0.868
(.582)

0.117
(.134)

Seniority on
Federal
Bench

-0.000
(.000)

-0.002*
(.001)

0.000
(.000)

-0.000
(.000)

-0.003*
(.001)

0.000
(.000)

Elite Law
School
Judge
Employment
Background:
Military

-0.026
(.047)

0.058
(.314)

-0.038
(.048)

-0.029
(.050)

0.034
(.335)

-0.042
(.049)

0.037
(.089)

0.651
(.419)

-0.049
(.083)

0.033
(.089)

0.676
(.407)

-0.051
(.084)

-0.020
(.069)
-0.152
(.098)

-0.447
(.252)
-0.670*
(.274)

0.017
(.059)

-0.021
(.069)

-0.463
(.246)

0.017
(.059)

-0.047
(.089)

-0.167
(.099)

-0.753*
(.261)

-0.055
(.091)

0.188
(.137)

0.345
(.510)

0.242
(.126)

0.174
(.134)

0.193
(.529)

0.235
(.125)

Catholic
Percentage

-0.013**
(.004)

-0.008
(.016)

-0.012**
(.004)

-0.014**

-0.014

-0.013**

(.004)

(.015)

(.004)

Jewish
Percentage
Adherence
Rate

0.004
(.009)
0.008
(.005)

0.054*
(.027)

-0.003
(.008)

0.003
(.009)

0.050*
(.023)

-0.003
(.008)

-0.016
(.023)

0.009
(.004)

0.008
(.005)

-0.013
(.022)

0.009*
(.004)

Government
State or Local
Judge

Law
Professor
Community
Demographics:

[79:185

The University of Chicago Law Review

(2)
(1)
School
All
Cases Cases
Year of
Decision
(Constant)
Pseudo R2
Percent

(3)
Other
Cases

(4)
All
Cases

(5)
School
Cases

(6)
Other
Cases

0.013
(.015)

0.035
(.085)

0.009
(.015)

0.014
(.015)

0.046
(.085)

0.010
(.016)

-27.250
0.043
64.13

-68.472
0.169
70.37

-19.009
0.034
63.46

-29.139
0.042
63.95

-91.836
0.172
69.14

-20.077
0.034
63.36

2322

324

1998

2322

324

1998

Correctly
Classified
(N)

Notes: Proreligion Outcome = 1. * p < .05; ** p < .01. Standard error adjusted for 13 clusters in circuits.

A. Findings on Political Party and Ideology Variables
In this study, "the 'Pro-Religion' dependent variable measures a
particular robust view about the propriety of religion in public life,"'
or, in this focused study on education, about the visibility and
presence of religion and religious viewpoints in public school and
public support for parents who wish their children to attend private
religious schools. Opponents of public recognition or
accommodation of religion in this educational context should not
casually be characterized as "harbor[ing] antipathy toward faith or
religious believers outside of this peculiar legal context,""9 but rather
as adopting a strict separationist or secularist perspective toward
interactions with religion in this particular realm of public life.
As Table 3 illustrates, in federal court cases that arise at the
intersection between the religion clauses of the First Amendment
and elementary and secondary education, political ideology emerges
as a robust predictor of outcomes. Holding all other variables
constant, a Republican-appointed judge was nearly twice as likely to
vote in a proreligion direction (at a rate of 59 percent) as was a
Democratic-appointed judge (at a rate of 30 percent). Using
common space scores as a proxy for ideology, the more conservative
judges were predicted to choose the proreligion side of the case at a
63.7 percent rate, compared with a predicted probability of a vote in
that direction of only 26.6 percent by the more liberal judges.
In two other phases of our religious-liberty decisions study, we
have separately explored the influences on federal judges when
deciding Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause cases
58
59

Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 508 (cited in note 26).
Id.
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generally (including both education and noneducation cases). In our
overall examination of Establishment Clause decisions in the federal
courts from 1996 to 2005, we found a powerful ideological or
political party influence on outcomes. Holding other variables
constant, Democratic-appointed judges were predicted to uphold
Establishment Clause challenges at a 57.3 percent rate, while the
predicted probability of success fell to 25.4 percent before
Republican-appointed judges.' By contrast, in the "Religious Free
Exercise/Accommodation" phase of the study, the lead story was the
impaired success rate for Muslim claimants, not the political leanings
of judges."
Knowing that political variables were significant and potent in the
general Establishment Clause case context, while not significant in the
general Free Exercise Clause case context, we included a dummy
variable for Establishment Clause cases in this combined educationfocused study so that the demonstrated political salience of
Establishment Clause cases would not drive the results. Importantly,
even with that control, ideology measured in alternative ways emerged
as a highly significant and substantively strong influence on the
outcome in school cases. In sum, what we observe here is not merely a
side effect of the political influences on Establishment Clause
decisions (as contrasted with Free Exercise decisions). Instead, we
believe we have likely uncovered something specific to the education
setting when Establishment Clause and Free Exercise decisions are
examined together in the public and private elementary and secondary
school context.
1. Party of appointing President.
Although crude and subject to multiple qualifications, the
simplest, most commonly used, most unambiguously reliable (for
accurate coding), most frequently verified as a meaningful and stable
influence on judges, and most easily interpreted measure as a proxy
for judicial ideology is party of appointing President (Republican or
Democrat).' For each judge casting a vote in a religious-liberty case
in our study, appointment by a Republican President was coded as
See Sisk and Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *14-15 (cited in note 30).
Gregory C. Sisk and Michael Heise, Muslims and Religious Liberty in the Era of 9/11:
Empirical Evidence from the FederalCourts *4-5 (unpublished manuscript, Aug 2011), online
at http:llpapers.ssm.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstractid=1917057 (visited Oct 21, 2011).
62 See Joshua B. Fischman and David S. Law, What Is Judicial Ideology, and How Should
We Measure It?, 29 Wash U J L & Pol 133, 167-68 (2009). For further discussion of this proxy
for ideology and its suitability in the religious-liberty study context, see Sisk and Heise,
110 Mich L Rev at *13 (cited in note 30).
60

61
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"1" and by a Democratic President as "0." Of the 2,322 judicial
participations on religious-liberty cases overall, 1,263 (or
54.4 percent) were by judges appointed by a Republican President
and 1,059 (or 45.6 percent) were by judges appointed by a
Democratic President.
Insofar as our alternative measures of ideology achieve
significance, both warrant closer examination. As shown in Figure 1,
holding all other independent variables constant at their means, the
predicted probability that a Republican-appointed judge would vote
in a proreligion direction is 59 percent, while the probability for a
Democratic-appointed judge was 30.1 percent-a margin difference
of 28.9 percent. 3 Thus, for the party that sought a religious
accommodation or defended a public interaction with religion, the
chance of success nearly doubled before a Republican-appointed
judge, as compared to a Democratic-appointed judge.

63 The vertical lines in Figure 1 represent the 95 percent confidence intervals for these
two predictions. Thus, while our best estimate is that a Republican-appointed judge is
59 percent likely to rule in a proreligion direction, the probability could be as low as
49.2 percent or as high as 67.9 percent. Similarly, while we predict that a Democratic-appointed
judge would vote for the proreligion side of the case 30.1 percent of the time, the probability
could be as low as 16.4 percent or as high as 43.8 percent. Because the probability that the
comparative values would appear both in the higher end of the interval for a Republicanappointed judge and in the lower end of the interval for a Democratic-appointed judge is much
lower than 5 percent, we are confident that the margin is higher, probably much higher, than
the 5.4 percent margin between the low and high ends of these two confidence intervals.
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FIGURE 1. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A PRORELIGION VOTE BY
JUDGE IN SCHOOL CASES, BY PARTY OF APPOINTING PRESIDENT
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
Republican

Democratic

Note: Figure 1 draws from Table 3, column 5.

Our political culture influences the agendas and policy goals of
those individuals who compete for the presidency, and in the United
States the two major political parties help shape the political culture.
As a result, the ways in which the two major political parties
approach religion and education policy warrant brief discussion.
During the past few decades, a "devotional divide"' has opened in
American politics and become embodied in the two major political
parties and their platforms. "All else equal," Professor William
Galston writes, "the more often individuals attend church, the more
likely they are to regard themselves as conservatives and vote
Republican."' Based on its 2008 survey of "religious intensity" and
social and political views, the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life
found that "[a]cross a variety of religious traditions, those who say
that religion is very important in their lives, express a more certain
belief in God, or pray or attend worship services more frequently
tend to be much more conservative in their political outlook and

64 David E. Campbell, A House Divided? What Social Science Has to Say about the Culture
War, 15 Wm & Mary Bill
Rts J 59, 64 (2006). For a general discussion of the religious divide in
partisan identification, see Sisk and Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *36-37 (cited in note 30).
65 William A. Galston, Political Polarization and the U.S. Judiciary, 77 UMiKC L
Rev 307, 318-19 (2008).
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more Republican in their party affiliation."' While many persons of
faith continue to affiliate with liberal political movements, the
Democratic Party has become the political home for secularists, who
have become a key constituency in the party and especially among
party activists. 7 By 1992, fewer than one-third of all delegates to the
Democratic Convention attended church regularly, fewer than onequarter found religion to be highly salient in their lives, and more
than 60 percent qualified as secularist in outlook. '
On the specific topic of education, the platforms of the political
parties confirm that Republicans look favorably at efforts to
acknowledge, accommodate, and interact with religion in the
educational setting, while Democrats look more skeptically at the
introduction of religion or religious influences into public education
or the inclusion of private religious school options in public
programs. Since 1972, every national Republican Party platform has
called for the return of prayer to schools.' The most recent national

66 The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey; Religious
Beliefs and Practices:Diverse and Politically Relevant 19 (Pew Research Center 2008), online at
http://religions.pewforum.org/pdf/report2-religious-landscape-study-full.pdf (visited Oct 21, 2011).
67 Andrew Kohut, et al, The DiminishingDivide: Religion's Changing Role in American
Politics 3, 89 (Brookings 2000).
68
Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American
Party Politics 105-09, 124 (Columbia 2001) (providing data on the religious beliefs and
practices of delegates to the Democratic Conventions from 1972 to 1992).
69
See Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform 44-45, 53-54 (The
American Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers-pdf
/78545.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican National Committee, 2004 Republican Party
Platform: A Safer World and a More Hopeful America 82 (The American Presidency Project
2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/paperspdf125850.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011);
Republican National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 2000 (The American
Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25849
(visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1996
(The American Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws
/index.php?pid=25848 (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican National Committee, Republican
Party Platform of 1992: The Vision Shared; The Republican Platform, Uniting Our Family, Our
Country, Our World (The American Presidency Project 2011), online at http:/
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php ?pid=25847 (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican.
National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1988: An American Vision; For Our
Children and Our Future (The American Presidency Project 2011), online at
http:/Iwww.presidency.ucsb.edulwslindex.php?pid=25846 (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican
National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1984: American's Future Free and Secure
(The
American
Presidency
Project
2011),
online
at
http:/
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845 (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican National
Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1980 (The American Presidency Project 2011),
online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25844 (visited Oct 22, 2011);
Republican National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1976 (The American
Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25843
(visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican National Committee, Republican Party Platform of 1972
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Republican Party platform (2008) "energetically assert[s] the right of
students to engage in voluntary prayer in schools and to have equal
access to school facilities for religious purposes."' During this period,
the word "prayer" has never appeared in national Democratic Party
platforms."
State Republican Party platforms have been even more
emphatic in approval of prayer and acceptance of a religious
presence in publicly supported education. For example, the current
platform of the Republican Party of Iowa says that "Judeo-Christian
values and Scripture should not be excluded from the public
schools,"" while Texas Republican platforms regularly "urge school
administrators and officials to inform Texas school students
specifically of their First Amendment rights to pray and engage in
religious speech, individually or in groups, on school property
More capaciously, the
without government interference.""
of
2009
Oklahoma Republican Party platform
affirm[ed] the right of students and teachers to the free exercise
of religion as guaranteed by the First Amendment, including the
right to wear and display religious symbols, voluntary vocal
prayer, optional Bible and religious study, religious expression
including holidays, and equal access to use of school facilities for
these activities."'
By contrast, the Colorado and Minnesota Democratic Party
platforms of 2010 specifically "support the separation of church and

(The American Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws
/index.php?pid=25842 (visited Oct 22, 2011).
70 Republican National Committee, 2008 Republican Platform at 44-45 (cited in note 69).
71 See, for example, Democratic National Committee, Democratic Party Platform of
1996: Today's Democratic Party; Meeting America's Challenges, Protecting America's Values
(The American Presidency Project 2011), online at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws
/index.php ?pid=29611 (visited Oct 22, 2011) (applauding "the President's work to ensure that
children are not denied private religious expression in school" without specifically mentioning
prayer).
72
Republican Party of Iowa, Our Platform §§ 4.30 to 4.32 (2011), online at
http://iowagop.org /platform.php (visited Oct 22, 2011).
73 See, for example, Republican Party of Texas, 2010 State Republican Party Platform 14
(Texas Tribune 2010), online at http:llstatic.texastribune.org/media/documents/FINAL_2010
STATEREPUBLICANPARTYPLATFORM.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011); Republican
Party of Texas, 2004 State Republican Party Platform 17 (Internet Archive 2009), online at
20
http://ia60033.us.archive.org/18/itemslTexasRepublicanPartyPlatforrTexasRPTPlatform O
4.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011).
74 Oklahoma Republican Party, Report of the Oklahoma Republican Party Platform
www.okgop.com/pdfsJPLATFORM2009
at
online
(2009),
8
2009
Committee
_APPROVED.PDF (visited Oct 22, 2011).
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state in public education"' and "church-state separation in public
school curriculum and educational funding." In contrast with the
national Democratic Party platforms that tend to avoid the issue, the
Washington State Democratic Party platform of 2010 specifies
opposition to "[o]rganized prayer in public schools."'
To the extent that Presidents and their judicial appointment
agendas reflect the processes and structures that frame American
political life, one might expect to find that ideology influences
federal judicial decisions involving religion and schools, at least at
the margins. Indeed, this finding of an ideological influence on
federal court decisions on religious liberty in the educational context
from 1996 to 2005 is consistent with results from our earlier study.'
In our study of religious-liberty decisions in the federal courts from
1986 to 1995, both traditional partisan and alternative ideology
proxies were not statistically significant in any of our major models."
The single exception was in the education context, where claims by
parents and schoolchildren for accommodation of their religious
beliefs or practices were more likely to be favorably received by
Republican-appointed judges. As we concluded then, "This result is
not surprising, given that conservatives in recent years have been
most critical of the educational establishment and frequently
bemoan the exclusion of religious influences from public educational
institutions; likewise, conservatives have been protective of the rights
of private schools to operate with minimal governmental oversight.""

75 Colorado Democratic Party, Colorado Democratic Party Platform Process 2010-12:
Platform Committee Report-v.6 Final 14 (2010), online at http://www.coloradodems.org/docs
/2010PlatformWeb.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011).
76
Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party Ongoing Platform 2 (2010), online at http://dfl.org/sites/dfl.org/files/2010%200ngoing
%20Platform.pdf (visited Oct 22, 2011).
77
Washington State Democrats, 2010 State Convention Platform: Plank 6; Education 2
(2010), online at http://www.wa-democrats.org/files/pdf/06%20-%20Education.pdf (visited Oct
22,2011).
78 See Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 602 (cited in note 26) (finding that
judges who were appointed to the lower federal courts by Republican Presidents were
significantly more likely to rule in favor of students or parents seeking a religious
accommodation in public schools from 1986 to 1995).
79
See id (concluding that political ideology did not have a significant effect on the
outcome of religious-liberty cases as a whole from 1986 to 1995 despite the evidence of a
significant effect in the narrower set of cases involving religious accommodations for public
school students).
80 Id.
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2.

Common space scores.

As an alternative measure of judicial ideology, and to further
test the robustness of a political or ideological influence in religiousliberty cases arising in public or private elementary and secondary
education, we also coded each district and court of appeals judge for
common space scores. Professors Keith Poole and Howard
Rosenthal originally developed the "nominate common space" score
measure of ideological preferences for members of Congress, placing
all aspects of legislative voting into the same ideological dimension
along a liberal-conservative continuum.' Subsequently, Professors
Michael Giles, Virginia Hettinger, and Todd Peppers adapted this
measure for the study of judges:
Scores on this dimension are scaled from -1 for most liberal to
+1 for most conservative. Absent senatorial courtesy the
measure of senatorial preferences is assigned a value of zero
[and the President's score is substituted]. If senatorial courtesy
is operative and there are two senators of the President's party
in a state, senatorial preferences are measured as the mean of
the common space scores of the senators.'
Among political scientists, common space scores have come to be
regarded as "the state-of-the-art measure for the preferences of US
Court of Appeals judges. '
Just as being appointed by a Republican President was
positively associated with a proreligion vote on the religious-liberty
claims in our study, being scored conservative on the common space
score continuum was also positively associated with a proreligion
vote. Holding all other variables constant at their means, the more
liberal judges under the common space score measure (at -0.6) were
predicted to cast a proreligion vote at a 26.6 percent rate, while the
more conservative judges (at 0.6) were predicted to vote in a
proreligion direction at a 63.7 percent rate.
In Figure 2, we generate the average predicted probabilities of a
positive vote on an Establishment Clause claim for each common
space score in the range from -0.6 to 0.6, at increments of 0.1, while

81 Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, Congress: A Political-EconomicHistoryof Roll
Call Voting 23-26 (Oxford 1997).
82
Micheal W. Giles, Virginia A. Hettinger, and Todd Peppers, Picking FederalJudges:A
Note on Policy and PartisanSelection Agendas, 54 Polit Rsrch Q 623,631 (2001).
83
Lee Epstein, et al, The Judicial Common Space, 23 J L, Econ, & Org 303, 306 (2007).
For a more detailed discussion of common space scores as an ideology proxy, see Sisk and
Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *13 (cited in note 30).
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holding the other independent variables constant. The solid, darker
line in the middle is the best estimate of the average predicted
probability for that increment in the common space score. The
lighter, broken lines that appear above and below are the higher and
lower parameters of the 95 percent confidence intervals for the
average predicted probability at each one-tenth increment of the
common space score continuum.
FIGURE 2. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A PRORELIGION VOTE BY
JUDGE IN SCHOOL CASES, BY COMMON SPACE SCORE INCREMENTS

0.8
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Note: Liberal < 0; Conservative > 0. Figure 2 draws from Table 3, column 2.

B.

Judge Background and Community Demographic Variables

A federal judge's prior experience as a state or local judge was
significantly and negatively correlated with the proreligion
dependent variable in the context of school cases. Thus, prior service
at the state or local level in the courts apparently was associated with
a judge's propensity to rule against educational accommodations for
religious adherents and against public educational policies
acknowledging religion. The standard hypothesis has been that "the
insulation from popular sentiments that the judicial office often
provides" should make a judge with prior judicial experience "more
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willing to support potentially unpopular claims."" However, when
that prior experience was obtained at the state or local level, where
judges often are subject to electoral approval, we previously have
suggested that such judges may develop habits of greater deference
to the products of the elected branches of government.'
In any event, the negative association by former state or local
judges with the proreligion dependent variable in school cases does
not fit comfortably into either interpretive package. While a vote to
accept the claim of a religious believer seeking a Free Exercise
Clause accommodation overturns the decisions of education officials
and agencies, a vote to reject an Establishment Clause challenge to
government interaction with religion affirms the actions of the
government. Perhaps local and state judges, having seen the
sometimes-volatile nature of religious disputes in their communities
and local schools, become skeptical about the wisdom of any
governmental interaction with or accommodation toward religion
and religious believers.
Greater seniority of the judge (measured by number of months
on the federal bench when the decision was issued) was also
associated with a negative vote on the proreligion dependent
variable. In prior research, the hypothesis has been that years of
seniority on the bench "test hardening not of the biological arteries
[as would age] but rather of the bureaucratic judicial arteries."' In
our prior study of religious-liberty decisions from 1986 to 1995, we
found the seniority or time on the bench of the deciding judge to be
significantly correlated with adoption of an antipolitical model for
interpreting the religion clauses of the Constitution-that is, a
tendency to overturn the decisions of the political branches of
government.' In contrast, in this study of religious-liberty decisions
from 1996 to 2005, the apparent adoption of a secularist perspective
by judges of greater seniority involves a mix of rulings that
sometimes defer to (in free exercise cases) and that sometimes
demur to (in establishment clause cases) the actions or policies of
government.
84 Jilda M. Aliotta, CombiningJudges' Attributes and Case Characteristics:An Alternative
Approach to Explaining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 71 Judicature 277, 279 (1988)
(speaking of Supreme Court justices with prior judicial experience).
85 Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 611 (cited in note 26).
86 Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited,
69 Am Polit Sci Rev 491, 499 (1975) (finding that judges who had spent more time on the
federal court of appeals tended to arrive at decisions that would generally be considered more
conservative than the decisions reached by their less experienced counterparts).
87 Sisk, Heise, and Morriss, 65 Ohio St L J at 516 (cited in note 26).
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In the end, this particular finding may be (at least in part) an
artifact of our introduction of a control variable for establishment
clause cases into this focused study of school cases. While that
control variable serves a vital purpose in clarifying the separate and
powerful effect of political variables on religious-liberty claims
arising in the educational context, it may serve to distort the
influence (or lack thereof) of such other variables as seniority.
Indeed, when we remove the Establishment Clause control variable
in alternative regression runs, seniority falls out of significance in one
of the two models. Moreover, in our separate studies of Free
Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause cases generally, seniority
on the bench does not approach standard significance thresholds.
Finally, we note the finding that a higher Jewish presence in the
population of the metropolitan area where the judge has his or her
chambers was significantly associated with a proreligion ruling by the
judge. Because Jews in the United States have "generally favored a
policy of stringent separationism,' '" this result is counterintuitive. As
we discuss elsewhere,8 we fear that our religious demographic
variables may mask other underlying influences, based on population
density or region of the country. Accordingly, without further
exploration and recalibration of demographic variables, we are
reluctant to place too much analytic weight on these specific findings.
CONCLUSION

In many ways, our finding that a judge's ideology influenced
whether a judicial outcome in religion clauses cases involving
elementary and secondary schools was proreligion does not surprise.
This finding did not jar either of us, even though we both cling to the
aspiration of impartial judging and view the rule of law as requiring
something more than judicial policy preferences in disguise. Of
course, to the extent that ideology is poised to emerge, it is hard to
imagine a riper context than what we selected for study-schools.
We are also mindful that skeptics of a "legal" model of judging
will find comfort and empirical support in the findings from this
study. A few important factors should temper any firm conclusions
drawn from these results, however. We begin by acknowledging that
law is not perfectly determinate in every case, particularly in
Establishment and Free Exercise Clause cases, that some level of
88 Michael J.Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va
L Rev 1, 58 (1996). See also Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities and the First
Amendment: The History, the Doctrine,and the Future, 6 U Pa J Const L 222, 238, 246 (2003).
89 Sisk and Heise, 110 Mich L Rev at *29 (cited in note 30).
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judicial discretion is both inevitable and, indeed, to some degree
desirable, and that judges, as human beings, bring to their judicial
decisions and analyses their general life experiences and perspectives
to the task. Indeed, current Supreme Court religion clauses
jurisprudence almost guarantees as much. By failing to more clearly
define its reasoning in majority opinions, by emphasizing a
multiplicity of theoretical approaches that resist distillation into a
single, coherent theme owing to uncertainties about discerning the
governing legal rules and doctrine, and by offering the vaguest
generalities in articulating adjudication standards, the Supreme
Court's religion clauses rulings all but ask even the most
conscientious of lower court judges to draw on personal reactions to
religion and political attitudes about the role of religion in leading
public institutions, including schools.
Compounding problems for lower federal court judges posed by
legal uncertainty, the education context, particularly elementary and
secondary schooling, is especially loaded from a political and
ideological standpoint. Indeed, precious few issues can be more
highly charged and politically sensitive than religious issues incident
to the operation of schools for the nation's youth. The school
endures as a unique institution in the manner in which it brings
together the public and private lives of citizens. It is also the locus of
a collision of rights and interests between and among students, their
parents, teachers, administrators, and citizens. Thus, either factorlegal uncertainty or a highly charged political context-would lead
many to expect that the judge's ideology will inform legal analyses.
That these two factors interact in our context all but assures that
ideology will play some role. Indeed, given our focus on religious
cases involving schools, we would have been far more surprised not
to find evidence of ideology influencing judicial outcomes in some
way.
Results such as ours, flowing from a specific context involving
one particular corner (albeit, an important one) of constitutional law,
benefit from greater context. Existing empirical evidence drawn
from the larger landscape of judging in the federal lower courts
provides little by way of empirical support for the conclusion that
judicial ideology or a purely attitudinal model of judicial decision
making has displaced the legal model. Specifically, the weight of
existing evidence drawn from studies exploring large numbers of
judicial outcomes across a diverse array of subject matter and fields
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suggests that extralegal factors, including a judge's ideology, explain
only a small part of the variation in judicial outcomes.'
In the future, researchers might consider extending our analysis
in various ways. For example, other discrete settings (that is, settings
besides school) would benefit from similar analyses to test whether
our findings are unique to the setting or, in contrast, are robust in
religion cases across various settings. Aside from whether alternative
contexts are studied, researchers might also consider the admittedly
arduous task of gathering and coding the larger set of unpublished
and undigested decisions. Although we do not feel that the inclusion
of unpublished decisions would materially upset our major findings,
similar analyses in different contexts strike us as a quite promising
and interesting avenue for future work. We are as curious as anyone
else about whether the salience of ideology that we find in the school
context would emerge in religion clauses decisions involving other
contexts.
Insofar as the push for education reform is unlikely to dissipate
anytime soon, the number and magnitude of intersections involving
religion and schooling will continue to increase and place increased
stress on legal doctrines. Thus, however one receives evidence of
ideology influencing judicial outcomes in religion clauses cases
involving schools, it is likely that this evidence will persist over time.

90 See Frank B. Cross, Decision Making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals 38 (Stanford 2007);
Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An EmpiricalInvestigation
of Legal Interpretation,65 Md L Rev 841, 882-84 (2006); Sisk and Heise, 99 Nw U L Rev at 746
(cited in note 30); Gregory C. Sisk, The QuantitativeMoment and the Qualitative Opportunity:
Legal Studies ofJudicial Decision Making, 93 Cornell L Rev 873, 877 (2008).

